On August 25, the Turkish warship “Kinaliada” visited the port of Benghazi. The following day, Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin met with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the “Libyan National Army,” and his deputy and son, General Saddam Haftar.

This visit and meeting mark a turning point in Turkey’s policy towards Libya, reflecting Ankara’s efforts to redirect its foreign policy on the Libyan issue. The main features include pragmatic diplomatic engagement with all Libyan actors while preserving its maritime interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, instead of siding with a specific party (the Government of National Unity in Tripoli) and militarily intervening on its behalf. Thus, the slogan “One Libya, One Army” in the Benghazi talks conveyed a new Turkish message: rather than supporting one camp, Ankara seeks to present itself as a mediator and partner among Libyan factions.

For most of the past decade, Turkey and Haftar’s Libyan National Army stood on opposite sides of the complex Libyan crisis. In 2019, Haftar declared Turkish assets hostile targets and Benghazi cut ties with Ankara. The military support Turkey provided to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord was crucial in halting Haftar’s 2020 assault on the capital. Hence, the Turkish warship’s visit to Benghazi — the first of its kind — and Kalin’s direct meeting with Haftar reflect the shift in relations from confrontation to cautious engagement. This shift was gradual, including reopening the Turkish consulate in Benghazi, resuming Turkish flights to the city, and multiple visits by General Saddam Haftar to Ankara.

At the core of this shift lies the 2019 maritime boundary demarcation agreement between Turkey and Libya signed with the Tripoli government, which has not been ratified by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives under Haftar’s influence. This agreement is a cornerstone of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” strategy, aiming to consolidate Ankara’s maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean and counter Greek and Cypriot claims. Through direct engagement with Haftar, Ankara seeks to ensure ratification of the agreement, which Bloomberg reports may occur in the coming weeks. This would open the way for Turkish companies to explore hydrocarbons in the area between Crete and Libya, a development with direct geopolitical implications for Greece, Cyprus, and the broader Eastern Mediterranean balance.

Turkey’s maritime diplomacy is expanding across the region. By increasing port visits from Egypt to Somalia and Libya, Ankara sends a message that its maritime openness is designed for political rapprochement with former adversaries, while cementing its role as a key Mediterranean power. The Benghazi visit also fits into Turkey’s broader pattern of reconciliation and regional rebalancing. After years of tension with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia — which had supported Haftar’s campaign — Ankara managed to repair relations with these parties. Thus, the Libya file, once a source of division, is becoming a potential arena for pragmatic coordination. The timing is significant; the Benghazi visit came shortly after President Erdoğan hosted the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, in Istanbul.

Ankara thus sends a message to all factions in the east and west that it is an indispensable party in any future political settlement concerning Libya. By keeping communication channels open with all parties, Turkey ensures it will not be sidelined in shaping Libya’s security architecture, energy partnerships, or reconstruction efforts. Investing in dialogue with Haftar is also Turkey’s attempt to affirm that reconciliation is possible despite Libya’s chronic political division, or at least to secure its core interests regardless of the division’s outcome.

Defense cooperation may be the bridge Turkey crosses in this path. Reports indicate that Saddam Haftar has given preliminary approval to purchase Turkish drones and to train Libyan National Army personnel in Turkey. If realized, Turkey would gain influence as a military supplier to armed forces in both eastern and western Libya, placing it in a long-term influential position when the Libyan army is eventually restructured.

Finally, Turkey’s openness to Benghazi also enhances its credibility with European partners, notably Italy, whose interests intersect with Turkey’s in Libya’s stability and curbing illegal migration flows to Europe (a Turkish-Italian-Libyan trilateral summit was held on August 2 to discuss ways to combat irregular migration from the southern Mediterranean coast towards Europe). It also sends a message to Washington that Ankara can play a constructive role in unifying Libyan security forces, aligning with U.S. calls for stability, even as Ankara insists on protecting its maritime interests.