Consociational democracy creates a political system based on consensus among the components of the people. It is a necessary choice under special circumstances the country faces to maintain balance among its components and achieve stability. It requires concessions from the majority to the minority in some cases to preserve national unity and societal peace.

Thus, consociationalism is a temporary condition imposed by the objective circumstances the country lives through, aiming to gradually transition from consociational democracy to representative democracy based on parliamentary representation and vote counting, as established by the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, which makes no mention of consociational democracy—a political custom adhered to by Iraqi components and blocs since 2003 until today.

It would have been more appropriate to return to the constitution and abide by it instead of the consensus that prevailed even in the parliament during voting on a package of laws by agreement, as recently happened with the general amnesty law, personal status law, and the law on returning properties to their owners. Each of these three laws represents a demand of one of the three blocs forming the Iraqi parliament.

Accordingly, the political custom has been that the President of the Republic is from the Kurdish component, the Prime Minister from the Shiite component, and the Speaker of Parliament from the Sunni component. Similarly, ministries have been divided among components: (Education, Planning, Trade, and Defense) reserved for Sunnis; (Education, Oil, Interior, and Sports) for Shiites; and (Foreign Affairs and Justice) for Kurds.

Results of this consociationalism included:

• First: Ministries became almost independent from the government body, effectively becoming independent governments themselves.
• Second: The Prime Minister lost the ability to select cabinet members and thus control ministries and manage their affairs according to his ministerial program.
• Third: These ministries turned into sources of funding that generate huge amounts of money for the blocs through various legitimate and illegitimate means.
• Fourth: Administrative and employment inflation due to ministerial changes and appointing affiliates from the minister’s clan, except in rare cases.

Cabinet reshuffle

Fifth: Lack of accountability since ministers are imposed on the Prime Minister, who has no right to dismiss or hold them accountable. We have often heard prime ministers express their desire for cabinet reshuffles and criticisms of some ministers, yet no reshuffle has been carried out by the Prime Minister’s will, rendering the government incapable of steering the country effectively under a consociational system.

The problem is not consociational democracy itself, which exists in many advanced countries like Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, but rather the non-consociational mentality prevailing among some. The mentality of exclusion and sectarian or tribal bias does not produce consensus but leads to quota-based division, which has become the basis for power-sharing in Iraq.

The phenomenon of quota division has no limits; it starts with sectarian quotas, extends to tribal quotas, and then to familial quotas. Selection is based on closeness to one’s bloc or sect rather than competence.

Thus, the end of consociationalism in Iraq was unfavorable, resulting in:

• First: Cementing the idea of components rather than citizenship, evident in many arenas, including elections reflecting component choice rather than candidates’ programs and solutions.
• Second: Conflict among parties and blocs instead of rapprochement and understanding aimed at consensus.
• Third: Prioritizing the interests of components and blocs over the nation’s interest under the pretext of electoral entitlement, which turned into a concept contrary to consociationalism, causing political processes to shift from consensus to conflict over gains and interests.

Therefore, there must be a review of the consociational approach and its practice with an exclusionary mentality that has led the country into dangerous pitfalls, by returning to the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, which established representative democracy in its finest form and gave everyone their rights based on vote counting—a rational principle humanity has followed since the time of Aristotle and Socrates and on which states and governments have been founded until today.