The echoes of the Israeli failure during the October 7 attack still resonate despite two years having passed, and the war of extermination on the Gaza Strip has not succeeded in obscuring its consequences, especially regarding the view of the occupation army and its security capabilities.

Social activist and head of the ‘Israel for the Negev’ association, Esther Luzato, stated that ‘the most important conclusions from the Gaza war, on the second anniversary of its outbreak, are that we face a small and foolish army,’ as it suffered a multi-dimensional and ongoing military failure, primarily due to a cognitive error stemming from self-blindness.

Luzato added in an article published by ‘Maariv’ newspaper that ‘this understanding was translated into reducing the number of army forces, cutting the security budget, and directing resources to internal affairs, which gradually led to a sharp reduction in ground forces, neglect, reduction of combat power, closing of battalions, cutting training, and redirecting most resources to the air force and intelligence.’

She confirmed that ‘the diaries of the Gaza war over the past two years proved that the ground army appeared almost nonexistent, and the army remained small but weak, leading to the emergence of a new combat doctrine called ‘the battle between wars,’ differing from the offensive approach adopted by the occupation army over the years.’

She explained that ‘the shift from a proactive security concept to a stagnant one laid the foundation for the security problems of recent years. After state leaders followed a multi-year approach focusing on preparing for every scenario, including the worst, the military and security establishment changed its course over the past three decades.’

She pointed out that ‘this negative approach is the starting point for the flawed security concept that characterized the army’s recent period, which became addicted to the concept of ‘anti-ballistic missile defense,’ despite its tactical successes here and there, alongside a strategic failure that allowed its enemies to grow with unprecedented strength.’

She added that ‘another problem that appeared during the Gaza war was the army’s over-reliance on technology, which is another major failure, despite its amazing technological capabilities, but it created a dangerous illusion of control and security.’

She confirmed that ‘the army has a ‘bloated’ military elite in ranks but is poor in strategic depth, and here lies another serious systemic failure in the weak and old structure for training senior officers.’

She mentioned that ‘the army suffers from a serious problem represented by an organizational culture based on fear and silence, resulting in many failures due to the corrupt and toxic organizational culture entrenched at its top.’