The political path between Najaf and Baghdad has been cut off since the Supreme Shiite authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, announced years ago his refusal to receive any Iraqi official. The path between Najaf and Tehran is unstable and has been marked by unannounced tensions for some time, according to those familiar with the relationship’s intricacies. Najaf clearly holds to its positions and views, while Tehran continues to use two approaches: an apparent diplomatic one and a hidden one aimed at attempts to control or reduce Najaf’s influence.

Direct and indirect messages, whether declared or undeclared, exchanged between Najaf on one side and Baghdad and Tehran on the other, reinforce the belief that the divergence in vision has reached a strategic level. It is no longer just a sharp disagreement on how to manage the state but has begun to concern the future of the Iraqi political system.

It is very clear that the duo (Tehran-Baghdad) is working with all remaining tools and influence to reproduce the authority based on the duality of “money and weapons,” considering it the only guarantee for the continuation of the 2003 system as established and to prevent any fundamental modifications or changes to its nature. This rigidity in positions and insistence on confronting the Iraqi interior with all its components and the exterior, especially the United States, has pushed Najaf along with historic religious houses, influential Shiite elites, and a national public opinion to warn of the dangers of an internal Shiite-Shiite clash, a Shiite clash with other components, and an external clash that could cost Iraq and especially the Shiites significant losses.

Colleague Ali al-Saray said in his journalistic report published by Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper yesterday (Thursday) titled “Tehran retreats before Najaf’s influence in Baghdad” that Najaf’s authority observes “an unprecedented worrying moment the political system is going through, losing its ability to continue amid rapid transformations in the regional environment, and it may fail to pass the most dangerous test since the establishment of the new system in 2003.” Ali al-Saray bases his writing on a series of interviews with figures from the Najaf environment, which can be described as religious elites, reflecting a traditional Shiite atmosphere beginning to sense concern and dangers for Iraq’s future while also sensing strength and the ability to limit Tehran’s already declining influence in Iraq, especially among the Shiite environment.

As usual in moments of danger, Najaf redefines priorities and insists on the necessity of building the state and combating corruption. It has reminded the armed Shiite political house of its constants on the occasion of the first of Muharram, when one of the representatives of the authority, Sheikh Abdul Hadi al-Karbalai, emphasized on July 17 the necessity of restricting weapons to the hands of the state and strengthening its institutions. At the same time, the ruling “Coordination Framework” tries to pass the “Popular Mobilization” law and turn it into a parallel ideological Ministry of Defense, while Najaf demands preserving the Popular Mobilization elements but on the condition of integrating them within the institutions.

In the confrontation between two projects—the state and the system—Najaf realizes the importance of its role in protecting the state and the Shiites in Iraq, while Tehran tries to exert its influence through the system in Iraq without considering the national interests of this majority, which might again pay the price of these external ambitions or in its battle to defend itself.