Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the sidelines of the Tianjin Summit (AP)

Two red carpets. One in Alaska, the other in Tianjin. The first was set by the US military in what some described as a “humiliating” manner.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s wish is coming true better than he imagined. Two images thousands of kilometers apart summarize the situation. Russia’s political isolation is gradually becoming a thing of the past.

Paul Sonne of The New York Times made a striking comparison. When Putin attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit three years ago, China was worried about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized that the current era “is not an era of war.” The recent Tianjin summit was different.

In the picture, Putin is breaking the isolation. However, politics is more than an image. Exiting isolation is not an end in itself but a means to achieve a goal. Several Russian objectives still await realization. During the Tianjin summit, Putin said in an interview that “Japanese militarism is revived under the pretext of fake Russian or Chinese threats, while steps are being taken in Europe, including Germany, to rearm the continent, with little regard for historical parallels.”

However, while Putin’s comments about Germany appeared in the full interview text, they were removed from the main English news reports accompanying it. According to The Times, this is because China is interested in developing relations with Europe and Germany. Thus, there is no alignment in views between China and Russia regarding foreign “threats.” Beijing sees Europe as an opportunity, while Moscow views it as a threat.

Putin and Modi’s laughter on the second day of the Tianjin summit attracted press attention. But behind that laughter lies potential concern. India has been subject to a 25% US tariff for buying Russian oil. The key question in Moscow is how much India can withstand US pressure before reducing its purchases. According to Reuters, New Delhi will increase its Russian imports next month by about 10 to 20 percent. In the long term, the picture remains unclear, and not only in the energy sector.

In October 2024, a report by the Chatham House Institute stated that the India-Russia relationship is experiencing a “managed decline.” Between 2009 and 2013, Russia accounted for 76 percent of India’s military imports. Between 2019 and 2023, those imports dropped to 36 percent. The war in Ukraine accelerated this trend further.

Even in Alaska, where Trump’s words seemed promising, Putin did not reap practical gains. The new administration is open to listening to Russia’s concerns and taking them into account, but this openness has not translated into significant US pressure on Ukraine to give up the entire Donbas region. Meanwhile, Trump tends to support a “safety net” for European guarantor forces that might deploy in Ukraine after the war ends, which is troubling for the Kremlin. Without this safety net, the chance of European forces deploying in Ukraine decreases. Russia has reiterated its rejection of this proposal.

In this sense, a fundamental question remains for decision-makers in Moscow:

What is the use of Russia emerging from isolation if it still struggles to achieve its minimum objectives in Ukraine?