The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, completed and filled by Ethiopia this year, has returned to the spotlight after its waters caused devastating floods and environmental and climatic changes affecting the downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt. The dam itself has been a subject of controversy among the Nile Basin countries, not limited to environmental and technical impacts and its hydroelectric capacity of six thousand kilowatts, but also Ethiopia’s historical claims to benefit from the vast water reservoir behind the dam’s huge storage capacity. Strategic and political concerns expressed by the affected countries about its construction and operation have escalated, as the vital basin is geographically shared by eleven countries, each with its own motives, interests, and fears. With the dam’s completion, Ethiopia now controls water policies, including floods and droughts, on the Blue Nile.

The dam is at the center of legal, political, and strategic disputes among three countries, with no agreement reached due to conflicting interpretations of each country’s stance on potential threats and the destructive effects feared by Egypt and Sudan. Egypt, as the largest beneficiary of the Nile, asserts its water rights based on historical agreements dating back to the colonial era, as does Sudan.

Since the announcement of the dam’s construction, Egyptian policies appeared surprised by the threat posed by the Ethiopian dam to the Nile, concerning population, agriculture, drought, and other existential threats linked to the watercourse as a lifeline covering 90% of Egypt’s water needs. Amid geopolitical tensions in this part of Africa, the options available to Egyptian and Sudanese decision-makers are less effective than before the dam’s existence. The dam has become a tangible physical reality, a sovereign symbol, and a political tool, even a weapon comparable to Russia’s Gazprom using the Nord Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Europe. The Egyptian government described the recent flood as an “industrial flood,” a politically charged term close to an act of aggression, especially since Egypt and Sudan consider the dam filling was done without agreement or coordination with them, violating international law obligations regarding water sharing.

However, the issue has moved beyond legal arguments to political maneuvers, costing much in terms of understanding or concessions. Egypt escalated its rhetoric in a Foreign Ministry statement to the UN Security Council, considering the unilateral action an existential crisis threatening the lives of over 100 million Egyptians and Sudanese.

The imminent danger faced by Sudan due to floods that inundated large parts of its territory amid ongoing war and near-total state absence makes disaster mitigation difficult. The destruction caused by floods due to the opening of the Ethiopian dam gates, including erosion and flooding of Sudanese lands, is incomparable to Egypt’s strength and preparedness to confront this unprecedented environmental disaster. Although many Sudanese experts have confirmed benefits Sudan could gain from the dam, such as stopping destructive floods, generating electricity, and increasing its water share under the 1959 agreement, resource management depends on state capabilities and stability. Thus, Sudanese lands remain either open to the dam’s waters or subject to the decisions of the dam-owning upstream or downstream states, including Egypt.

There are undeniable indications of the Zionist entity’s involvement in the Renaissance Dam project in the strategically significant Horn of Africa region, and rumors about Israel’s potential to encircle Egypt by controlling its natural resources.

With this massive project, considered the project of the century, Ethiopia, a landlocked country, may rethink its geographical and water strategy, including extending its influence to the Red Sea through the Eritrean port of Assab, as stated by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and military leaders. These motives intertwine with an imperial historical background that could ignite the Horn of Africa region and revive border disputes and ethnic conflicts within Ethiopia itself, making it impossible to benefit from the dam’s outputs and maintain its sustainability. The project, launched by Ethiopia as a national project with domestic developmental dimensions, is likely to extend its impact on its foreign policies with Nile Basin countries, especially Egypt, the main state in the water conflict axis, in upcoming developments that will not end with diplomatic negotiations and international treaties.

There are undeniable indications of Israel’s relationship with the Renaissance Dam project in the Horn of Africa, with its strategic weight and international dimension, including rumors about Israel’s ability to encircle Egypt from outside its borders by controlling its most important natural resources. Israel’s relations with regional countries extend into various cooperative fields; it has cooperated with Ethiopia in dams and international and financial support. Israel’s ambitions to use the dam align with its biblical myths of achieving Greater Israel from the Euphrates to the Nile, pressuring Egypt and directly benefiting from Nile waters. Israel’s presence in the dam states region goes beyond diplomatic levels to intense strategic presence, following long-term policies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The natural effects of droughts and floods have emerged, making the dam a factor in power balance policies using new resources that may surpass military power, imposing on the geopolitical map the possibility of conflicts affecting issues with international and continental links in a regional scope. Economic, political, and military repercussions between upstream and downstream countries are expected to increase, potentially escalating uncontrollably without coordinated negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement for all parties. Could the dam, announced with economic goals, become a weapon in Ethiopia’s hands to use against its neighbors whenever it wishes? The dam, which carries risks related to its structural integrity and technical defects, has raised experts’ concerns. Ethiopia proceeds with chauvinistic enthusiasm, preparing to celebrate what it considers a historic continental achievement linked to national slogans as a message to the Ethiopian interior.

In this water conflict scenario, the downstream countries Egypt and Sudan face new tests and challenges with a new water map related to their existential struggle and supreme interests, requiring a stance where no country can remain neutral without intervention proportional to its harm from the new reality imposed by a water dam controlled from outside their borders. If the national security vision does not expand beyond system protection to state protection in its existence, new facts will surprise more than results have, ignoring threats set far from borders. What prevents Ethiopia from turning the dam’s water gates into long-range cannons to deliver its policies and those of other powers competing for influence in the existential conflict between upstream and downstream countries?

The upcoming conflict adds to water disputes on the Arab world map, as with the Euphrates between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, and the Jordan River, despite ecological differences with the Nile. The steady population growth in Egypt and Ethiopia and the constant search for renewable water and energy resources, according to the ongoing conflict perception between them, may hold more surprises than current forecasts suggest, read alongside current policies by both parties to reach an understanding that avoids environmental and political risks, easing confrontations that could ultimately lead to an uncontrollable clash.