The last week of August is set to encapsulate many of Lebanon’s deep crises. The visit of the US presidential envoy Tom Barrack and his deputy Morgan Ortagus to Lebanon, accompanied by a large American delegation, will increase US pressure. At the start, they carry the Israeli response to Lebanon’s proposals related to the November 27, 2023 understanding, along with similar Syrian messages about the borders and various arrangements. By the end of the week, they are preparing to decide on the extension of the UNIFIL mandate. Thus, the entire week is dedicated to discussing the old and new versions of Resolution 1701. What will it bring?

The few days of August 31 each year carry significant historical memories. This month began with Lebanon’s 80th Army Day and will end with the 45th anniversary of Imam Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance. Other serious military, security, and political events are commemorated, including the July 2006 war and the issuance of Resolution 1701 on August 12, the first deployment of the Lebanese army in the south on August 17, 19 years ago, and the 43rd anniversary of the election of the martyred President Bashir Gemayel.

This reference is not only to recall these milestones but also to discuss the current hours before the meetings of Barrack and Ortagus today in Beirut, accompanied by a US Congress delegation and a technical military team, besides the delegation present since yesterday led by US Congress member Darin Lahoud. Lebanese officials await Israeli responses to the recent proposals exchanged with Barrack early last week and the outcomes of his meetings in Paris, Tel Aviv, and Damascus before arriving in Beirut.

It is not useful to dwell on leaked information and scenarios that preceded and accompanied their talks, especially in Tel Aviv. Prior to their arrival, statements came from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office on August 29, saying Lebanon’s decision to limit weapons is an opportunity to restore sovereignty and build institutions. If Lebanese security forces take steps to disarm Hezbollah, Israel will take reciprocal steps, including a gradual reduction of the Israeli army presence in coordination with the US. Israeli army radio indicated that the five points in southern Lebanon were not part of the ceasefire agreement and were imposed as a fait accompli by Israel, later announcing that Israel would officially withdraw from these points if Hezbollah is disarmed.

Despite Ortagus’s thank-you comment on Netanyahu’s position, sources familiar with US negotiations revealed they have seen more unofficial contradictory Israeli positions and will not take any stance until Barrack presents them officially. Lebanon is no longer tempted by such equations without precise and official information from the US mediator, following the principle ‘don’t count your chickens before they hatch.’ Therefore, Lebanon will not comment officially before these stages are completed. Some words sometimes obscure the truth, others cause concern, while reassuring phrases are rare.

Political and diplomatic references advise caution and vigilance against positions that ‘put poison in honey,’ especially as some in Beirut interpret Israeli positions to support what they call ‘open confrontation’ with Israel. Meanwhile, others fabricate narratives to build positions before verifying their accuracy and importance. Hastily launched slogans feed sedition and incitement, and fuel internal tension that allows agitators to control Lebanese minds, spirits, and morale, increasing rigidity based on preconceived demagogic theories.

Against this backdrop, efforts continue to address files on the tables of ruling and government officials in the coming busy days filled with meetings that do not stop and short-term decisions. This explains attempts to facilitate implementing the ‘weapon monopoly’ decision and create favorable conditions to keep the issue within the national framework, avoiding further internal fractures based on absolute rejection of its implementation. Some express concern about projects to hand over weapons to Palestinians in some camps between Beirut and the south. These positions do not focus on the scale of these operations, which can be interpreted differently, some seeing them as weak steps, others as indicators of major political decisions supporting the Lebanese state and its legitimate institutions over any other weapons.

Political and diplomatic references believe this week will certainly indicate the frameworks the ‘weapon monopoly’ file will follow in the future, without providing a ‘final’ conclusion to this path, which will face various obstacles, some very high and others surmountable in stages if the formula prepared by the US envoy and his team is completed. This depends on Israeli and Syrian responses to Lebanese observations, as revealed by President Michel Aoun, who linked progress in the ‘weapon monopoly’ decision according to the army’s awaited plan to their prior approval.

However, the end of this week will bring a halt to the regional and international debate over the fate of the UNIFIL extension decision. The mandate expires next Sunday, so the decision will be issued as every year between August 29 and 30. If reports from New York are correct that the session to discuss the French draft extension was postponed from yesterday to next Friday, this ensures suitable conditions to take the final decision within the ‘deadline’ for the extension decision, which cannot tolerate any delay regardless of the form of the decision and any amendments it may include regarding the forces’ work mechanism, extension period, and rules of engagement.