The concept of “Greater Israel” in Zionist ideology includes Palestine, Jordan, and parts of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements about a “historic and spiritual mission for the Jewish people related to Greater Israel” are inseparable from Israel’s brutal extermination war waged for nearly two years in Gaza. This war aims to make the Gaza Strip uninhabitable and to expel Palestinians, while undermining the Palestinian state option in the territories occupied in 1967 under the slogan of no “Hamas” or “Fatah” in Gaza or the West Bank, effectively removing Palestinians from political equations in what is considered “Lesser Israel”.

On one hand, Netanyahu’s government is pushing its agenda in the region by imposing wide demilitarized zones reaching the river Al-Ouli south of Beirut in Lebanon (not just the Litani River), and extending to the borders of the Damascus Governorate, including southern provinces (Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida), along with attempts to intervene in these countries under the pretext of protecting minorities (sectarian or ethnic).

This path aims to position Israel as the dominant regional state in the Levant, which is the intended meaning of “Greater Israel” Netanyahu spoke of, believing himself a divine envoy to achieve it. According to Zionist doctrine, Greater Israel includes Palestine from the river to the sea, Jordan, and parts of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt.

On the other hand, Netanyahu’s government openly reveals its intention to reoccupy the Gaza Strip or maintain Israeli security and administrative control over it. This explains its insistence on no full withdrawal from Gaza in negotiations, seeking to separate Gaza completely from the West Bank and any form of Palestinian political entity. Israel insists on continuing its oppression and starvation of Palestinians to force many to leave the Strip by direct military means and indirect coercive methods, including starvation.

Netanyahu’s government has publicly outlined five main principles summarizing its war aims in Gaza: disarming Hamas, recovering Israeli prisoners (alive or dead), imposing Israeli security control over the Strip, establishing a civilian administration excluding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and ensuring security through a permanent Israeli military presence.

In contrast, the Palestinian national movement currently lacks options or plans to thwart Israeli objectives or reduce their risks to Palestinians and their legitimate national rights.

There is a current state of loss for Hamas, a significant gap between its capabilities and ambitions, slogans and realities, illusions and facts, especially between what it demanded during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation (late 2023) and what it demands now, limited to humanitarian aspects and stopping Israel’s war and army withdrawal from some Gaza areas.

Regarding the official Palestinian leadership, including the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, and Fatah, their response to the new Palestinian catastrophe is limited to two directions: announcing plans to organize elections for the Palestinian National Council, an unexpected leap under current conditions, especially after canceling the legislative council elections in 2021, with doubts about its implementation given the organization’s stagnation and marginalization since the Authority’s establishment.

The other direction is the possibility of a unilateral declaration of the Palestinian state to accompany new international recognitions at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly meeting in September.